Beyond Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010

Abstract

The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster of 2010 resulted in devasting outcomes. Due to cost-cutting and profit-driven decision-making, 11 fatalities, 17 injuries, and an oil spill that released almost 5 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico occurred. Engineering failures included BP’s decision to use only six centralizers instead of the recommended 21 and the cancellation of a crucial cement bond log test. 62% of past blowouts over a 14-year period were due to improper cementing. The economic impact was severe, with 250,000 jobs lost in the Gulf region and US oil production declining by 31,000 barrels daily. BP allocated a $20 billion escrow fund to compensate victims of the disaster, but long-term environmental damage remains immeasurable. Solutions to prevent this in the future include reframing BP’s ethical duty through moral frameworks, which would result in implementing real-time safety monitoring systems, mandatory third-party audits, and enforcing stronger industry-wide regulations to reduce risk. Ethical frameworks, including deontological ethics and utilitarianism, prioritize the moral duty to prioritize human lives over profits, which BP failed to do. Emphasizing a safety-first culture, strengthening regulatory compliance, and holding leadership accountable for their decisions would help corporations prevent similar catastrophes while enabling long-term economic and environmental sustainability.

Introduction

When corporations prioritize financial gain over ethical responsibility, the consequences can be catastrophic. The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster is a prime example of how corporate negligence, lack of strong regulatory oversight, and decision-making without ethical considerations can lead to great harm. BP’s failure to implement proper safety precautions, disregard for best practices, and emphasis on profit at the expense of human life and environmental sustainability reflect deep ethical lapses. By examining this case through the lenses of virtue ethics, deontological ethics, utilitarianism, and justice-based ethics, it becomes evident that BP’s decisions were legally and morally indefensible.

BP’s decision to use fewer centralizers than recommended, bypass crucial safety tests, and prioritize efficiency over precautionary measures shows a violation of deontological ethics, which emphasizes duty and moral obligations. Virtue ethics also conflict with the company, which calls for moral integrity, responsibility, and prudence in decision-making. Rather than embodying these virtues, BP was reckless, ultimately causing multiple deaths, injuries, and devastation to the Gulf region ecosystem. Justice as an ethical concept failed to be upheld when BP showed it would rather shift blame than take full responsibility for the disaster. The greatest good for the greater number of people in the utilitarianism framework would condemn BP’s actions as short-term financial gains for the corporation won over the long-term destruction of thousands of entities.

This paper will analyze the key ethical failures that contributed to the BP oil spill, specifically in terms of corporate greed, poor risk management, and regulatory gaps that enabled the disaster. Much information will be cited from BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010 by Christina Ingersoll et al. (2012), as well as other business ethics and biblical readings. It will also include alternative ethical and technical approaches BP could have taken, such as a safety-first corporate culture, enhanced regulatory compliance, and stronger ethical leadership. This analysis will underscore why moral responsibility in corporate decision-making is crucial by examining these through ethical frameworks. Systemic business ethics and governance flaws lead to catastrophic outcomes, and we will explore how that came to be for the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster.

Analysis of Main Issues and Problems

BP’s Decisions and Failures

BP’s decisions were an ethical failure, prioritizing profit over safety. Failure to address recurring safety issues and engineering choices such as fewer centralizers, an unreliable well design, and skipping critical safety tests led to disaster.

BP was accused of evading accountability multiple times before the Deepwater disaster. According to BP and the Deepwater Horizon Disaster of 2010 by Christina Ingersoll et al., disaster struck BP twice in a 12-month period in the early 2000s, and the Baker Report was created to report on BP’s negligence in safety precautions. March 23, 2005, marked the first accident when an explosion at BP’s Texas City Refinery killed 15 people, injured another 180, and resulted in financial losses exceeding $1.5 billion (2012, p. 5).

In March 2006, over 200,000 gallons of oil poured into the bay from a corroded hole in the pipeline, making it the largest oil spill in Alaska (p. 6). BP previously operated in Alaska, where “Alaskan state regulators had warned BP since 2001 that its management procedures were out of alignment with state regulations and that critical equipment needed to be better maintained” (p. 8). By avoiding accountability by not truly solving concerns by regulators head-on, it was evident that profit-motivated decision-making was a leading cause of the Deepwater disaster in 2010. BP’s multiple pipeline failures foreshadowed what would be coming in 2010 when disaster struck again on a mass scale.

Design-wise, multiple key decisions for the well operating in the Gulf region were motivated by cost-cutting, which led to selecting a well design with fewer barriers to gas flow. BP chose the long string casing option over the safer tie-back option. “The liner/tieback casing option provided four barriers of protection against gas and oil leaks...compared to the liner tie-back option, the long string casing option took fewer days to install” (p. 12). On March 25, 2010, BP drilling engineer Brian Morel emailed that the long string option “saves a lot of time,” at least three days, influencing BP’s decision despite the risks.

Another failure was using fewer centralizers than recommended. The contractor hired by BP to cement the well, Halliburton, advised using 21 centralizers, but BP used only six, increasing gas flow risk. “The cement would fill the space between the outside of the pipe and surrounding rock, allowing a more uniform cement sheath to form around the pipe while preventing any gas from flowing up the sides” (p. 11). Morel stated they had six centralizers only, dismissing further adjustments to save time (p. 12). “No one had considered postponing or putting a stop work order on the cement job until centralizers of the right kind were located” (p. 15).

BP also failed to circulate the mud and conduct a cement bond log. A 2007 U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS) study found that cementing was the primary factor in 18 of 29 Gulf of Mexico blowouts over 14 years. The American Petroleum Institute recommends circulating drilling mud at least once before cementing, which takes 6-12 hours. However, BP completed circulation in just 30 minutes on April 19, 2010 (p. 15). Additionally, BP canceled the cement bond log, paying the cancellation fee of 7% of the total service cost instead of getting the service done properly. It was the only way to detect bond failure, yet BP prioritized cost savings over safety. These unethical choices resulted in a devastating oil leak that killed 11, injured 17, and damaged 25 national wildlife refuges. Louisiana alone lost 12,000 jobs, with U.S. oil production declining by 31,000 barrels daily. Two hundred fifty thousand jobs were lost in the Gulf region. The government established the GCCF, providing a $20 billion escrow fund, with $3.6 billion paid to 170,000 claimants.

Possible Alternatives

BP could have prioritized safety, transparency, and accountability. Accepting the costs of safer well design and recommended centralizers could have reduced risks. For example, drilling engineering team lead Gregory Walz advised using 20 centralizers instead of six, stating, “There is no incremental cost” when scheduling to ship them in a combined flight with other materials. Even a “small additional measure of safety” would have been worth the extra cost, as noted by Brett Cocales. Overall, using more centralizers would have been a better alternative than using only six.

Conducting the cement bond log could have been another alternative to prevent the disaster. A 2007 MMS study identified cementing as the most crucial factor in well blowouts. As Jesse Marc Gagliano, BP's cementing contractor representative, warned, potential channeling could have been detected earlier if BP had followed industry best practices.

Improved oversight and accountability could have reinforced safety procedures. “Each site manager managed their ‘asset’ autonomously...there was little incentive to share best practices on risk management” (p. 4). BP could have created an independent safety enforcement body rather than allowing autonomous site management.

Accountability issues were evident in BP’s safety culture. A workforce survey found that employees did not believe “process safety is a core value at BP” (p. 5). BP’s motto of “no accidents, no harm to people, and no damage to the environment” was viewed as an individual rather than a collective responsibility where if personal injury rates were declining, that was showcased as improvement, providing a false sense of confidence that safety was a priority (p. 6). Strengthening group safety rules and enforcing stricter policies could have mitigated risks. Implementing these alternatives could have reduced the likelihood of disaster while preserving BP’s reputation.

Constraints and Reasons

Financial pressure, industry norms, and regulatory loopholes influenced BP's decisions. In the mid-2000s, deepwater drilling became more profitable, leading to a surge in deepwater rigs despite high costs. BP acquired Macondo Prospect rights in 2009 but lacked full financial authority. Transocean, charging BP $500,000 daily, influenced decisions, adding financial strain. By the 80th day, the rig “had far exceeded its original budget,” prompting cost-cutting measures (p. 8). Short-term savings led to substantial long-term financial losses. Industry culture also valued efficiency over caution, even though a biblical worldview would encourage higher ethical standards. Weak regulatory enforcement also allowed BP to take risks, which suggests that more regulatory agencies would benefit the safety of people and the environment. Ethical business practices demand adherence to safety regardless of regulatory gaps. Future industry-wide technical and ethical changes could prevent similar disasters.

Strategies and Solutions

As a result of the 2007 Baker report, Halliburton’s OptiCem model, BP’s cost-cutting measures, and regulatory reforms, BP or another corporation in the future could mitigate the disaster by implementing a safety-first culture, strengthening regulatory compliance and industry standards, embedding strong ethical leadership and corporate accountability, and effective risk management and crisis preparedness. These ethical frameworks within corporate decision-making would have been essential to avoid disasters like this. Long-term safety and moral responsibility would build trust in the future and prevent further catastrophes.

Safety-first culture

BP faced significant issues, including the lack of a robust safety-first culture. Enhancing process safety systems, upgrading equipment and maintenance protocols, standardizing safety policies, and strengthening auditing would have made their work environment safer. Ethically speaking, deontological and virtue ethics provide relevant insights into achieving a safety-first culture.

Enhancing their process safety systems through implementing an automated safety monitoring system would help continuously track maintenance and safety indicators on rigs. They could leverage real-time data analytics to identify and predict equipment failures before they even occurred. Furthermore, more rigorous equipment maintenance schedules would ensure that components such as blowout preventers were regularly tested and maintained. Had BP established a company-wide safety policy that was clearer, more consistent, and reinforced from the top-down, they wouldn’t have as many competing corporate values and weak commitment to process safety since their pre-existing policies were not emphasizing safety enough. Lastly, if they conducted stronger auditing and oversight mechanisms, hazards may have been detected before they occurred. For example, they could conduct independent safety audits and establish an external overseer of operations to verify compliance with safety standards. Whistleblower protections and independent reporting channels to highlight potential hazards in advance should have been promoted.

In terms of business ethics, a mixture of deontological ethics, better corporate moral duties, virtue ethics, and a shift to a moral duty and rights perspective could foster a true safety-first culture that prioritizes human lives over profits. Kantian ethics emphasizes that safety should be a non-negotiable duty rather than an optional consideration. Seeing this as a categorical imperative means that BP would have acted according to these universalized principles. According to J. B. Wight in Ethics in Economics: An Introduction to Moral Frameworks, individuals should "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (2015, p. 41). Cutting costs at the expense of safety is unethical since it cannot be universally justified. Furthermore, organizations have a duty to protect the lives of their employees and stakeholders, regardless of profitability concerns. By viewing strict safety compliance as a moral duty rather than a regulatory burden, BP would show its employees and others within its industry the importance of people as the center of its business, not money.

Strengthening Regulatory Compliance and Industry Standards

BP’s Deepwater Horizon disaster revealed major regulatory failures and industry-standard weaknesses that could be combatted by stricter regulatory oversight, in addition to automated systems and remote-controlled shutoff valves, more investment in safety infrastructure, and clearer division of responsibility. It would also benefit from justice and rights-based ethics to reframe safety and compliance as a non-negotiable.

On an industry-wide level, having regulatory agencies like the Bureau of Saftey and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) enforce stricter inspections and maintenance audits for offshore drilling equipment could have prevented the disaster. Additionally, requiring oil companies to underdog regular third-party audits and certifications to ensure compliance would help update safety protocols. Additionally, automated safety systems to monitor systems helped to track blowout preventer integrity in real-time. Another idea is installing remote-controlled shut-off valves that automatically seal wells in an emergency. Regulatory compliance would be further strengthened through the whistleblower idea previously mentioned. The industry should allow whistleblowers to come forward across all oil companies and ensure employees and personnel would be protected with transparent, anonymous safety concern reporting channels with independent oversight (versus internal channels).

Regarding infrastructure, BP has already earmarked $7 billion for safety upgrades after previous disasters. Still, as an industry, a mandatory budget should be set aside to invest in safety upgrades for all oil companies. This would create a better industry-wide culture that puts safety first. Lastly, safety responsibilities were confusing since the Deepwater Horizon disaster involved BP, Transocean, and Halliburton, which led to confusion over safety responsibilities. Regulatory frameworks should require that one entity is clearly accountable for ensuring compliance across all contractors on a rig.

The ethical frameworks that may help strengthen regulatory compliance and industry standards include the moral duty to prioritize human life over profit. In Business Ethics by Dr. A.K. Gavai, he asserts that “duty and rights are correlated...everyone has a right to live, and everyone has a duty not to create harm” (2009, p. 48). Utilitarian ethics would also help promote the greatest good for many people. Rather than cutting costs at the expense of safety, ensure long-term sustainability to reduce the risks for workers, communities, and the environment. If BP adopted a “rule utilitarianism,” they could justify strong compliance standards and use positive long-term outcomes as their reasoning. Justice and right-based ethics, such as John Rawl’s Theory of Justice, would also help ensure BP stuck to regulations and did not evade responsibility through legal loopholes. Lastly, the natural rights theory applies here because BP has a moral and legal duty to respect employees’ inalienable right to work in a safe environment and the public's right to a clean environment. By viewing these ethical frameworks as non-negotiables, BP, its people, shareholders, the surrounding environment, the economy, and more would have been significantly better off.

Strong Ethical Leadership and Corporate Accountability

Poor leadership and weak corporate accountability played a key role in this catastrophe. Real-time ethical decision-making systems, mandatory ethical leadership training, and corporate penalties for ethical breaches would be potential solutions to the leadership and accountability problem. Effective accountability must be rooted in moral philosophy, bringing in Kant’s Categorical Imperative philosophy and Aristotle’s virtue ethics.

Real-time ethical decision-making systems would help track compliance in real-time through flags that will let the corporation know when they violate an ethical policy. They can also create immutable records of executive decisions affecting safety, ensuring transparent accountability for leadership actions. Mandatory leadership training on ethics could also be another solution to immerse ethical leadership principles that focus on virtue ethics and moral responsibility. “We are faced with two very different frameworks of judgment. The first is the economic ethic of total cost-benefit analysis... The second is an ethic of identity—doing what is right based on how one perceives oneself” (Wight, 2012, p. 8). Training leadership executives with ethical training would reinforce that safety and ethics must override financial incentives. Corporate penalties for ethical breaches could also be effective because bearing legal or financial responsibility for unethical decision-making would ensure that safety protocols are not violated.

Kant’s categorical imperative framework would also be beneficial here. If BP’s leadership asked themselves, “Would it be acceptable if all companies acted this way,” their answer would be very telling as to whether or not they should. “Markets cannot function effectively outside the framework of values such as obligation and reciprocity” (p. 7). Framing the problem this way makes decision-making more straightforward and more about what ought to be the path forward to create a fair marketplace where industry practices are held to the utmost highest standards.

Effective Risk Management and Crisis Preparedness

Lastly, the Deepwater Horizon disaster revealed risk management and crisis preparedness deficiencies. Enhancing equipment maintenance and inspection protocols, installing mandatory emergency response drills and crisis simulations, and disclosing risk assessments could prepare them for a crisis. Kant’s moral duty principle, Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian perspective, and John Rawl’s theory of justice speak to this solution to create a work environment where robust risk management can take the forefront in corporate decision-making practices.

Regular third-party safety audits should be mandated to ensure compliance with industry standards is updated. BP failed to address 390 critical safety repairs, leading to unnecessary operational risks (Ingersoll et al., 2012, p. 8). Furthermore, mandatory emergency response drills would prepare offshore drilling teams for blowouts and oil spills if they conduct a quarterly full-scale crisis simulation. Emergency protocols should be legally required and independently reviewed to ensure effectiveness. As mentioned, establishing an independent body for deepwater drilling operations that enforces safety compliance is a high priority. This body can require oil companies to implement redundant blowout prevention mechanisms to prevent failures, such as the preventer malfunction in BP’s case that contributed to the disaster.

Kant’s moral duty principle also plays into these solutions–corporations must prioritize safety as a fundamental obligation rather than a financial consideration. It asserts that law cannot replace morality and must be guided by deeper ethical duties (Gavai, 2009, p. 45). BP had a moral duty that it failed to uphold. Furthermore, Bentham’s utilitarian perspective suggests that ethical decision-making should maximize the well-being of the greatest number. The loss of human life, environment, and economic devastation strengthens this point. Markets operate within a moral ecosystem, and long-term “survival” depends on ethical choices (Wight, 2015, p. 4). Lastly, People have a right to security, and corporations have a duty to ensure that happens (Gavai, 2009, p. 49). Rawl’s theory of justice demands that corporate decision-making be done to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders (workers and the local communities). BP’s risk management style ultimately violates those fundamental rights.

Personal Experience

My personal experience in my workplace and education relates to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster in terms of business ethics. At one point in time, my company prioritized financial gain over what was just and fair, and my university 1) prioritized scientific excellence over the love of all people and one’s obligations to do right by their vulnerable stakeholders and 2) put the interest of money savings over the general health of its student body. I am happy to be no longer a part of the controversy in my workplace since the settlement occurred and that I contributed to my university’s student body as I worked to raise awareness and dismantle the PepsiCo contract to raise students' health. At one point, my company was involved in corporate misconduct. My company allegedly engaged in illegal financial kickbacks and fraudulent healthcare claims, similar to how BP prioritized cust-cutting over safety, leading to the worst oil spill in US history. BP’s disaster was caused by ignoring safety warnings to cut costs and maximize profits, much like my company’s alleged engagement in kickbacks to drive revenue at the expense of ethical medical practices. Both companies failed to demonstrate corporate virtue, showing greed over integrity. They both had a moral duty to operate ethically, as deontological ethics would frame it. Still, they violated their duty to care–BP towards the environment and workers, my company towards patients, and fair business practices.

In the case of my university, we protested the plan to develop a thirty-meter telescope (TMT) in Hawaii. My university and BP are involved in pursuing technological advancements but with major ethical dilemmas–BP’s oil drilling and the TMT’s construction on indigenous land. The environmental impact is also similar, where the TMT project was deemed controversial due to its impact on sacred land–a culturally sacred aspect of Hawaiian’s way of living–and BP’s oil spill harming ecosystems in the Gulf region. The TMT project and BP’s failure to show environmental and social responsibility go against virtue ethics by prioritizing expansion over ethical consideration. My university had a duty to respect indigenous communities but failed to do so just as BP failed to prevent environmental harm.

In another case with my university, I worked as an education and social media intern within the student-led Healthy Beverage Initiative Research Group. My sole purpose was to raise awareness about the PepsiCo contract we had that enabled Pepsi to take up the majority of shelf space in our campus stores. We also had shortages of free drinking water, which harmed students' health and environmental sustainability through increased sugar intake, heightened plastic waste, and more. PepsiCo promoted unhealthy beverages on campus in exchange for sponsorships, and BP risked environmental catastrophes for financial gain. Both infringe on the health of society. BP’s oil spill affected the health of its surrounding community, while the PepsiCo contract contributed to the rising student soda consumption, increasing the risks of obesity and diabetes. A virtue ethics perspective would argue that both the contract made at my university and BP lacked ethical foresight to see how financial agreements could harm the long-term well-being of its most vulnerable stakeholders. Similarly, deontological ethics would argue that my university had a duty to promote student wellness over corporate partnerships, and my team and I urged our chancellor to consider canceling the contract when it came due. He was open to our feedback but appeared unresponsive about whether he would consider it (2020).

Overall, the ethical failures at my workplace and university show that business ethics and moral frameworks are needed everywhere because of how pervasive ethical failures really are. My company and my university prioritized corporate greed over ethics, ignored marginalized voices, and failed to show they cared to protect the well-being of others. These examples involve a moral dilemma where financial interests conflict with ethical responsibilities. We need to do a better job because the consequences of doing so harm people, the environment, public trust, and more.

Biblical Integration

The Three Balancing Principles

The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster case illustrates the consequences of disregarding ethical principles grounded in God’s holiness. In the Theology of Work article produced by the TOW Project, “Three Balancing Principles,” holiness, justice, and love are the three legs that make up divine moral standards. The BP case is the perfect example of how a lack of moral responsibility led to a catastrophic disaster.

Holiness

The “Three Balancing Principles” emphasizes “holiness” as the devotion to God’s moral standards. BP’s choice to cut costs and ignore safety concerns, such as failing to conduct proper bond tests, demonstrated a failure to uphold ethical and safety standards. Exodus 20:16 states, “You shall not bear false witness,” which suggests that businesses should operate with transparency and truth, not downplay the potential risks, especially when other lives are involved.

Justice

Biblical justice, as seen in Proverbs 11:1, “A false balance is an abomination to the Lord, but a just weight is His delight,” mandates fairness in dealings. BP’s prioritization of profit over environmental and worker safety ultimately led to the devastation. This contradiction to the principle of justice, such as when they chose to reduce the number of centralizers and bypass safety tests, harmed employees, the environment, and the economy.

Love

A love-driven approach would have prioritized people and ethical responsibility over short-term profits. Instead, BP’s negligence resulted in the loss of human life, environmental devastation, and financial ruin for many workers. Jesus, on the other hand, commands love: “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Mark 12:31).

Applying the 4 P’s to BP’s Ethical Failures

In The 4 P’s of Business by Kevin DeYoung, DeYoung presents a theological framework for what’s considered ethical in business: purpose, product, people, and profit (2011). BP’s failure to uphold these principles undoubtedly led to why the well led to such moral and environmental catastrophe.

Purpose

The article emphasizes that a business must serve a greater good beyond just making money. DeYoung says, “A good business serves people and promotes the common good.” Colossians 3:23 states, “Whatever you do, work heartily, as for the Lord and not for men.” This means that ethical work is done with integrity and purpose. Instead, BP prioritized cost-cutting through profit-driven decision-making, compromising environmental stewardship and human safety.

Product

BP’s products should be valuable and ethical and not harm people. DeYoung teaches us to “provide real value and do not cause harm.” Additionally, Proverbs 22:1 teaches us that “A good name is more desirable than great riches.” Yet, BP’s reputation was soured due to these ethical failures via their negligence that directly violated the principle of doing no harm, which was also BP's internal motto. However, their actions (such as not conducting a cement bond log test–despite warnings) illustrate speed over safety.

People

DeYoung stresses that businesses must care for their employees and customers. “People should not be treated as mere tools for profit.” Still, 11 people died, and 17 others were directly injured as a result of BP’s actions to “prioritize efficiency over employee safety,” as seen in the Baker Report. Their failure to listen to engineers' concerns about integrity is a clear example of disregarding people’s well-being for financial gain.

Profit

Even though profit is necessary for a business, DeYoung shares that “profit should be pursued in a way that reflects honestly, fairness, and stewardship of resources.” Furthermore, 1 Timothy 6:10 warns that “the love of money is the root of all evil,” whereas BP’s cost-cutting motivations contradict this ethical principle. By prioritizing a faster and cheaper well-sealing process despite known risks, the Committee of Energy and Commerce’s investigation found that they repeatedly chose risky procedures, $374 million of damages in lost oil, fines, environmental devastation, etc., proving that when short-term profits are prioritized, long-term destruction may actually ensue instead.

References

DeYoung, K. (2011, April 21). The 4 P’s of business. The Gospel Coalition. https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/kevin-deyoung/the-4-ps-of-business/

Gavai, A. (2009). Business ethics. Global Media.
Ingersoll, C., Locke, R. M., & Reavis, C. (2012). BP and the Deepwater Horizon disaster of

2010. MIT Sloan School of Management.

Theology of Work Project. (n.d.). Three balancing principles. Theology of Work. Retrieved March 10, 2025, from

https://www.theologyofwork.org/key-topics/ethics/narrative-case-presentation-of-ethics/t

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Wight, J. B. (2015). Ethics in economics: An introduction to moral frameworks. Stanford University Press.